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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

cases establishing this rule are rather old, and while the reasoning
may have been justified in their time, the developments of modern
medicine and psychology weaken the support of that argument since
insanity is now generally regarded as a disease. 2 The logical
conclusion is that a death resulting from the insured's insanity
should place the same liability on the insured as would a death
resulting from cancer or any other disease not specifically excluded
by the insurance contract.
Dictum in an early North Dakota case 23 indicated a preference
for the majority view. The court in a later decision, however,
apparently adopted the minority view in holding the insurer liable
for the self-destruction of the insane insured even though the policy
24
specifically excluded all deaths resulting from mental disease.
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-The plaintiff owned residential property within 2,000 feet of a
portion of Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, on which jet engines
were continually tested. She alleged her property was "taken"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution because it was rendered uninhabitable by the incessant

jet noise and vibration. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of South Carolina held, that there could be no taking
without flights over the plaintiff's land. United States v. Leavell,
234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
That the technical trespass of direct overflight is necessary
before there can be a "taking" under these circumstances has been
read into the two Supreme Court decisions in this area. The first,
United States v. Causby,1 held that although the land might have
been used for other purposes, there was a "taking" when the glide
path of the aircraft crossed the plaintiff's land at an altitude below
that classified by statute as "navigable airspace, ' 2 rendering the
plaintiff's chicken farm unproductive. Subsequently, Congress added
the airspace necessary for takeoffs and landings to the "navigable
airspace. '" But in the second of these two decisions, Griggs v.
Allegheny County,' the Court found that although the new limits
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 N.C. 141, 27 S.E. 39 (1897).
22.
24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 92 (1949).
23. Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of America, 14 N.D. 116, 103 N.W. 402, 404 (1905).
24. Weber v. Interstate Business Men's Acc. Ass'n., 48 N.D. 307, 184 N.W. 97 (1921).
1. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
2. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 3, 52 Stat. 973. See also, Air Commerce
Act. of 1926, ch. 344, § 10, 44 Stat. 568 (establishing free right of air transit for interstate
and foreign commerce).
3. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24).
4. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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were not exceeded, there was still a "taking" because interference
with the airspace above the property consituted interference with
the legitimate use of the property, which would be unconsitutional
without compensation. Both cases involved overflights and both
found liability. The Supreme Court has never said there can be no
liability without the overflights.
Lower federal courts, however, have consistently interpreted
the above decisions so as to deny a remedy where overflights have
not been present, 5 although at least one6 has used language indicating liability might be found in the absence of overflights if the
property were rendered uninhabitable. No allegation that a plaintiff
was unable to continue living on residential property has been made
previous to the instant case. 7 It was made here; and by refusing
to consider this argument the court became the first explicitly to
hold that overflights would be required to find a "taking," regardless
of other circumstances."
Why should overflights be required before a "taking" may be
found? A vigorous dissent in Batten v. United States9 argued that
the requirement is unrealistic and unnecessary. The dissenting judge
stated that the true test of whether a "taking" has occurred is
whether a servitude has been imposed on the property, and where
this is the case, the property should be considered "taken," regardless of the presence or absence of overflights.
The reason given by the lower federal courts for this requirement
is that finding liability where there have been no overflights would
destroy the distinction between a "taking" and consequential
damages.'0 But the distinction is not found in the vector of the
force which does the taking. In rejecting a holding that shock
waves traveling horizontally cannot constitute "taking" while shock
waves traveling vertically and having the same effect may do so, 1'
a court would be clarifying, not destroying, the distinction. When
a government-owned dam on government property backs up water
and destroys the value of private property, the damage cannot be
5. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955
(1963) ; Bellamy v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964) ; Freeman v. United
States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958) ; Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl.
1964).
6. Batten v. United States, supra note 5.
7. In some of the cases, however, the interference has been similarly great. See,
e.g., Bellamy v. United States, supra note 5.
8. In cases involving overflights resulting in compensation, the compensation has been
given on the basis of the extent of the interference with the property. See Davis v. United
States, 155 Ct. Cl. 445 295 F.2d 931 (1961). And there is no recovery where overflights
occur but do not Interfere with the use of the property. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport,
84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
9. 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962).
10. E.g., Avery v. United States and Bellamy v. United States, supra note 5.
11. Batten v. United States, supra note 5, at 584, "The plaintiffs argue that the actual
damage in Causby resulted from noise and vibrations and that if recovery is permitted
for sound and shock waves travelling vertically, it should also be allowed for such waves
travelling laterally." The court relied on Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th
Cir. 1956) in rejecting this argument. But the court In the Nunnally case did not distinguish between vertical and horizontal shock waves.
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called consequential.1 2 The water has physically invaded the property and a "taking" has occurred.1 3 Shock waves flowing from a
government air base similarly invade neighboring property. It would
seem that where the invasion is so great that residential property
can no longer be used for that purpose, the property has been
"taken" just as effectively as if it were flooded. Where interference
stops short of entire deprivation of the normal use of the property,
it may be classified as consequential damage. 14 This is the proper
line of distinction between damage and a "taking."
The dissent in the Batten case, which argued that a distinction
between noise and shock waves traveling vertically and those traveling horizontally was unreal, has been called the better view by
two state supreme courts. 15 One of them,' at least, felt this would
be the position taken by the Supreme Court if it rules on the
question.
DONALD H. LEONARD
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-OPTION TO PURCHASE PREMISES-ACTION
DAMAGES WITHOUT TENDERING PERFORMANCE-The plaintiff

agreed to lease certain lands for three years with an option to purchase at any time during the term. Eight months later the defendantlessor repudiated the lease, including the option, and requested the
plaintiff to vacate the premises. In an action for damages to recover
the difference between the option price and the fair market value
of the property, motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit was
granted because until the plaintiff had exercised the option, there
could be no breach and therefore no recoverable damages. The
Supreme Court of Oregon, with two justices dissenting,' held that
a tender of the purchase price was not necessary because it would
require the plaintiff to make his election before the term he had
bargained for had lapsed. And despite the fact that the plaintiff might
not have exercised his option, the defendant, whose repudiation of
the option created this element of uncertainty, could not be relieved
of liability on the ground that the damages were speculative.
Fullington v. M. Penn Phillips Co., 395 P.2d 124 (Ore. 1964).
12. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) ; accord, Pumpelly v. G.B. & M. Canal
Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1891).
13. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) ; United States v. Lynah, supra
note 12.
14. See Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
15. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) ; Martin V. Port
of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964).
16. Martin v. Port of Seattle, supra note 15.
1. Goodwin, J. dissents on the ground that damages are too speculative. Repudiation
of the agreement did not terminate the option and the plaintiff still has the remainder
of the term in which to exercise it. Even if the optionor no longer had the power to perform (which is not the case) the better rule would require the optionee to exercise the
option before bringing an action for damages.

